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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-3149 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
  
JOSE LUIS FLORES-MEJIA, a/k/a JOSE FLORES MEJIA,  
a/k/a JOSE LUIS MEJIA, a/k/a MANUEL MENDEZ 
 
Jose Luis Flores-Mejia, 
         Appellant 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(Crim. No. 2-11-00712-01) 
District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 10, 2013 
 
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: July 19, 2013) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 Jose Luis Flores-Mejia was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment following his 
guilty plea to a single count of reentry after deportation.  On appeal, he contends that his 
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sentence must be vacated because the District Court failed to sufficiently consider an 
argument he made in his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing hearing: that his 
attempts at cooperation with the Government warranted a below-Guidelines sentence.  
The Government acknowledges that the District Court erroneously imposed the sentence 
without considering the cooperation argument.  However, it contends that defense 
counsel’s failure to object to this error at sentencing means that Flores-Mejia’s claim is 
subject to, and fails upon, plain error review.  The Government recognizes that we held in 
United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) that no additional objection is 
required under circumstances such as these, but urges us to overrule Sevilla or at the very 
least not follow it. 
 For the reasons that follow, we conclude that we are bound by Sevilla and that we 
are not permitted to revisit that case as a three-judge panel.  Accordingly, we will vacate 
Flores-Mejia’s sentence and remand for resentencing. 
I. 
 The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed.  Flores-Mejia, a native and citizen 
of Mexico, has an extensive criminal record and has been deported from the United 
States on numerous occasions.  On April 10, 2012, he pled guilty in the District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to one count of reentry following deportation in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).  Based on a criminal history category of VI and an 
offense level of 21, which included a 16 level enhancement due to one of Flores-Mejia’s 
prior crimes of violence, his Guidelines range was calculated as 77-96 months in prison. 
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 In his sentencing memorandum, Flores-Mejia raised several grounds for 
downward departures and variances.  Relevant here, he argued for a below-Guidelines 
sentence based on two meetings with Government agents, during which he purported to 
provide “detailed information regarding a homicide and a prostitution ring” in Newark, 
New Jersey.  App. 58-59.  The memorandum also explained, however, that the 
Government determined that the homicide in question had been solved and that Flores-
Mejia’s information regarding that crime was contradicted by other evidence, and that the 
Government decided to not pursue the information regarding the prostitution operation.   
Flores-Mejia was sentenced in July of 2012.  At the hearing, the District Court 
first gave meaningful consideration to a number of Flores-Mejia’s arguments for a lower 
sentence that are not relevant here.  The Court ultimately denied those requests.  
Subsequently, the parties addressed Flores-Mejia’s argument that his two separate efforts 
at cooperation regarding criminal activity in Newark warranted a lower sentence.  Both 
the Government and defense counsel offered lengthy proffers regarding Flores-Mejia’s 
attempts to provide the Government with information, consistent with the allegations in 
the sentencing memo.  Defense counsel then urged the Court to “consider [Flores-
Mejia’s] actions in proffering [to the Government] even though they did not rise to the 
level of a [motion for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1] in this case.”  App. 
102-03.  Following defense counsel’s colloquy, the Court stated: “Ok thanks, anything 
else?”  App. 103.  The District Court proceeded to sentence Flores-Mejia to 78 months’ 
imprisonment.  
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The District Court did not in any way address or mention Flores-Mejia’s request 
for a below-Guidelines sentence based on his attempts at cooperation other than that bare 
acknowledgment, and neither defense counsel nor the Government brought this failure to 
the District Court’s attention, via an objection or otherwise.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
 A. Standard of Review 
 Flores-Mejia’s sole contention on appeal is that his sentence is procedurally 
unreasonable because the District Court failed to sufficiently consider the argument that 
his attempts at cooperation warranted a lower sentence.  Under the familiar sentencing 
framework outlined in United States v. Gunter, a district court must at the third and final 
step of the sentencing process consider the relevant sentencing factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a).  462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  To satisfy this step, a district court 
must “acknowledge and respond” to “any properly presented sentencing argument which 
has colorable legal merit and a factual basis.”  United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 
(3d Cir. 2012).  Failure to give “meaningful consideration” to any such factor renders a 
sentence procedurally unreasonable and generally requires remand for resentencing.  Id. 
The Government contends, however, that Flores-Mejia’s claim is subject to plain 
error review because his counsel did not object when the District Court failed to address 
Flores-Mejia’s argument regarding his attempts at cooperation.1  The Government argues 
                                              
1
  The Government does not dispute that Flores-Mejia’s argument was properly 
presented to the District Court or that it had a factual basis.  Nor could the Government 
persuasively argue that the request lacked “colorable legal merit,” given that other courts 
have held that a defendant’s attempts at cooperation are properly considered under 18 
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that Flores-Mejia loses under plain error review because his argument regarding 
cooperation was “clearly meritless, bordering on frivolous,” and he therefore cannot 
establish “that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the court said 
more about his meritless variance claim,” Gov’t Br. at 43, 49-50, as is required to prevail 
under plan error review.  Flores-Mejia counters that our review is limited to whether the 
District Court gave “meaningful consideration” to his asserted grounds for a lower 
sentence, as per United States v. Sevilla, 541 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2008).   
As the Government acknowledges, in Sevilla the defendant raised two grounds for 
a downward variance on two separate occasions—once in his sentencing memorandum 
and once at the sentencing hearing—but both grounds went unmentioned by the District 
Court in imposing sentence, other than to say it had “considered all of the § 3553(a) 
factors.”  Sevilla, 541 F.3d at 232.  Aside from raising the pleas for a lower sentence on 
two occasions, Sevilla’s counsel did not lodge an objection when the District Court failed 
to address those arguments.  We squarely held that under those circumstances, “the 
District Court’s failure to address those issues did not require Sevilla to re-raise them to 
avert plain error review of these omissions,” and that such claims were instead subject to 
“meaningful consideration” review.  Id. at 231.  So too here.  Flores-Mejia raised his 
attempts at cooperation both in his sentencing memorandum and at the sentencing 
hearing, but that argument went unmentioned by the District Court.  Sevilla squarely 
                                                                                                                                                  
U.S.C. § 3553(a).  See, e.g., United States v. Petrus, 588 F.3d 347, 356 (6th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 33-34 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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precludes us from applying plain error review to Flores-Mejia’s claims even though his 
counsel did not lodge an additional objection to the sentence. 
The Government candidly concedes that Sevilla “supports Flores-Mejia’s assertion 
that the issue was . . . preserved,” Gov’t Br. at 23, but contends that Sevilla is 
“anomalous,” id. at 27, and that its holding “cannot be sustained,” id. at 36.  The bases 
for the Government’s arguments in this respect are as follows.  First, the Government 
contends that the rule set forth in Sevilla is premised on an erroneous reading of our en 
banc holding in United States v. Grier, where we stated that “an objection to the 
reasonableness of the final sentence will be preserved if, during sentencing proceedings, 
the defendant properly raised a meritorious factual or legal issue relating to one or more 
of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  475 F.3d 556, 571 n.11 (3d Cir. 
2007).  According to the Government, this statement was dicta because the en banc Court 
in Grier “had no occasion to consider what standard of review should apply in a case 
such as this.”  Gov’t Br. at 25-26.  Second, the Government argues that Sevilla “conflicts 
with later decisions of this Court” such as United States v. Russell, 564 F.3d 200, 203 (3d 
Cir. 2009) and United States v. Vazquez-Lebron, 582 F.3d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 2009), where 
we applied plain error review to claims that were not brought to a sentencing court’s 
attention.  Third, the Government contends that “virtually [all other Circuits are] 
unanimous in applying plain error review where a defendant fails to object at sentencing 
to the procedural reasonableness of the sentence,” and that Sevilla therefore conflicts with 
other Circuit authority.  Gov’t Br. at 28-29.  Fourth, the Government notes that we should 
revisit Sevilla because this issue is an “important, frequently recurring one.”  Id. at 23.  
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The Government also suggests that a rule requiring defendants to lodge additional 
objections saves time and effort in that it allows “any ambiguity [at sentencing to] . . . be 
instantly corrected” and is therefore better than the rule announced in Sevilla.  Id. 39-41. 
But none of these arguments provide a basis for a three-judge panel of this Court 
to revisit a binding decision that controls the outcome of a case.  “Under our Internal 
Operating Procedures, a panel of this Court cannot overrule an earlier binding panel 
decision; only the entire court sitting en banc can do so.”  Chester ex rel. N.L.R.B. v. 
Grane Healthcare Co., 666 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1).  
Alternatively, intervening Supreme Court precedent or amendments to statutes permit us 
to revisit a binding panel decision without invoking our en banc procedures.  See id.; see 
also Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996).  The Government’s 
arguments regarding Sevilla, however, are at most arguments for why our Court should 
reconsider Sevilla en banc.  See, e.g., Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.3.1 (listing the necessity to 
“maintain uniformity of [the Court’s] decisions” and the involvement of “question[s] of 
exceptional importance” as criteria used to determine whether to hear a case en banc).2 
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  We note that the Government’s contention that Sevilla is inconsistent with 
subsequent cases such as Russell and Vazquez-Lebron is incorrect.  Both Russell and 
Vazquez-Lebron involved our consideration of arguments that the defendant did not at 
any point raise to the sentencing court.  See Russell, 564 F.3d at 206; Vazquez-Lebron, 
582 F.3d at 446-47.  Thus, by definition, neither case dealt with the question of whether 
an additional objection is required when the District Court fails to entirely address an 
argument that was brought to its attention.  Moreover, as Flores-Mejia correctly notes, 
other post-Sevilla decisions have hewed to the rule announced in Sevilla.  See, e.g., 
Begin, 696 F.3d at 414.  In addition, at least one other Circuit has stated that it “see[s] no 
benefit in requiring the defendant to protest further” under these circumstances, and has 
worried that such a “requirement could degenerate into a never-ending stream of 
objections after each sentencing explanation.”  United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578-
8 
The Government does invoke subsequent Supreme Court authority as a basis to 
revisit Sevilla, but we find that attempt unavailing.  Specifically, the Government 
contends that Sevilla has been undermined by the Supreme Court’s decision in Puckett v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009).  See Gov’t Br. at 33-35.  But, like Russell and 
Vazquez-Lebron, see supra n.2, Puckett deals with a situation in which the defendant 
raised an argument for the first time on appeal.  It was therefore undisputed that the 
argument was not preserved at all, and the issue was not whether additional objections 
were required.  Thus, Puckett does not provide a sufficient basis for a three-judge panel 
to revisit the binding holding of Sevilla.
3
 
B. Whether The District Court Meaningfully Considered Flores-Mejia’s 
Arguments Regarding a Lower Sentence 
Having determined that the Sevilla standard of review governs this case, we 
consider whether the District Court meaningfully considered Flores-Mejia’s argument for 
a lower sentence based on his attempts at cooperation.  In Sevilla, we concluded that the 
                                                                                                                                                  
79 n.3 (4th Cir. 2010).  This is consistent with the standard set forth in Rule 51(b) for 
preserving a claim of error, “by informing the court—when the court ruling or order is 
made or sought—of the action the party wishes the court to take.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 
51(b).  Despite these reservations, we do not express a definitive view as to the 
desirability of the rule announced in Sevilla, let alone of the desirability of revisiting that 
case en banc.  Suffice it to say that the Government has offered no persuasive counter to 
our conclusion that Sevilla dictates the outcome we reach in this case. 
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  We acknowledge that the Supreme Court in Puckett stated a preference for 
requiring preservation of errors to “give[] the district court the opportunity to consider 
and resolve them.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134.  But preservation was arguably satisfied 
here given that the defendant did raise (twice) the argument he now raises on appeal.  At 
most, the Government has shown that both the Supreme Court and our Court have, in 
connection with other sentencing fact patterns, favored appellate review rules that are 
different from the rule set forth in Sevilla.  These arguments will be properly considered 
if and when the occasion arises to revisit Sevilla. 
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sentencing court’s statement that it had “considered all the § 3553(a) factors” was not 
sufficient to show the required meaningful consideration. This is an a fortiori case under 
Sevilla.  Here, the District Court’s statement (“OK thanks, anything else?”) constitutes a 
bare acknowledgement of Flores-Mejia’s argument.  Unlike the statement we deemed 
insufficient in Sevilla, the court’s acknowledgement here does not even imply 
consideration of the argument, let alone a response to it.  See Begin, 696 F.3d at 411.   
Once again, the Government candidly admits that Sevilla “arguably supports 
Flores-Mejia’s position” that the claim was not sufficiently addressed, but “again 
respectfully suggest[s] that Sevilla is not binding authority, as it overlooked and 
conflicted with controlling Supreme Court precedent in Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 
338 (2007).”  Gov’t Br. at 44-45.  In Rita, however, the District Court had “asked 
questions about each [sentencing] factor” raised by defense counsel as a basis for a lower 
sentence, and had summarized each argument.  Rita, 551 U.S. at 344-45, 358.  Thus, 
while the Court in Rita did say that a “lengthy explanation” was not required regarding 
all relevant § 3553(a) factors, the District Court’s interaction with all of the arguments 
raised by defense counsel in that case stand in stark contrast to the District Court’s bare-
bones acknowledgment of Flores-Mejia’s arguments in this case.  It cannot be said that, 
as a matter of law, Sevilla is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s prior holding in Rita.4 
                                              
4
  The Government also suggests that “there was no error at all” because Flores-
Mejia’s “request for a variance based on attempted cooperation . . . was clearly meritless, 
bordering on frivolous.”  Gov’t Br. at 43.  But, as noted, Sevilla only requires that the 
claim has “colorable” legal merit in order to require remand if the District Court fails to 
consider it, and we are unable to conclude that a request for a variance based on attempts 
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III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will remand for resentencing. 
                                                                                                                                                  
at cooperation, which the Government acknowledged, is completely devoid of legal merit 
so as to be considered frivolous.  See also supra n.1. 
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United States of America v. Jose Flores-Mejia 
 
No. 12-3149 
_________________________________________________ 
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 
 I respectfully dissent because I believe that we should 
not remand for resentencing where the need for resentencing 
could easily have been avoided by requiring Flores-Mejia to 
have contemporaneously objected to the District Court‟s 
explanation of his sentence. 
 
 The majority concludes that we must vacate and 
remand for resentencing because the District Court did not 
meaningfully consider Flores-Mejia‟s argument that his 
attempts at cooperation warranted a lower sentence.  The 
majority holds that we are precluded from applying plain 
error review to Flores-Mejia‟s claim even though, when 
sentence was imposed, Flores-Mejia did not object to the 
District Court‟s failure to consider his argument.  The 
majority insists that this is so because under our precedent in 
United States v. Sevilla, a defendant need not “re-raise 
[issues] to avert plain error review.”  541 F.3d 226, 231 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  I submit that, in the interests of justice and of 
judicial economy, our holding in Sevilla should be revisited.  
In any event, I submit that the District Court‟s judgment of 
sentence here should be affirmed. 
 
I. 
 
In Sevilla, we directly addressed the question of 
whether a defendant, who raises an argument during the 
2 
 
sentencing proceedings, must object when the District Court 
fails to address the argument at the time sentence is imposed.  
541 F.3d at 228.  We answered in the negative, citing to our 
en banc opinion in United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 
n.11 (3d Cir. 2007), where we had noted that “an objection to 
the reasonableness of the final sentence will be preserved if, 
during sentencing proceedings, the defendant properly raised 
a meritorious factual or legal issue relating to one or more of 
the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  541 F.3d at 
231.  Beyond the reliance on Grier, the Sevilla opinion 
offered no further justification for its holding. 
 
For several reasons, the holding in Sevilla is flawed.  
First, as the government asserts, the cited portion of Grier is 
dictum and thus not binding on our Court.  In Grier, we 
addressed the substantive reasonableness of the District 
Court‟s sentence, not the issue presented in Sevilla and in the 
instant case, namely what standard of review applies where 
the defendant challenges whether the District Court 
adequately addressed an argument presented at sentencing.  
Because the Sevilla opinion contains scant justification for its 
holding beyond its reliance on Grier, there is good reason to 
revisit it.   
 
Furthermore, the rule articulated in Sevilla conflicts 
with precedent in most other circuits, which apply plain error 
review where the defendant did not object at sentencing to the 
District Court‟s explanation of the sentence.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Davila-Gonzalez, 595 F.3d 42, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Mondragon-Santiago, 564 F.3d 357, 361 & 
n.2 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Judge, 649 F.3d 453, 
457-58 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 
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997, 1003 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rice, 699 F.3d 
1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 
795, 805 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 
1173, 1177-78 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wilson, 605 
F.3d 985, 1033-34 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
1
  As the majority 
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 Only the Fourth Circuit has affirmatively adopted the same 
approach as Sevilla.  See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572 
(4th Cir. 2010).  In Sevilla, we suggested that the Seventh, 
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits disagreed with the plain error 
review approach adopted by the majority of circuits.  This is 
not accurate.  The cases from these circuits cited in Sevilla 
did not address the same question at issue in Sevilla, i.e., 
whether a defendant must object to the district court‟s 
explanation of the sentence to preserve the issue for appeal.  
See United States v. Dale, 498 F.3d 604, 610 n.5, 611-12 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (whether defendant must object to substantive 
reasonableness of sentence to preserve issue for appeal); 
United States v. Swehla, 442 F.3d 1143, 1145 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(whether defendant must object to substantive reasonableness 
of sentence to preserve issue for appeal); United States v. 
Williams, 438 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (whether a 
court‟s failure to comply with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1) is 
reviewed for plain error).  In fact, the Seventh Circuit has 
adopted plain error review in circumstances similar to those 
in Sevilla.  See, e.g., United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 
1003 (7th Cir. 2010) (reviewing for plain error defendant‟s 
claim that the district court failed to properly consider the 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in sentencing him to supervised 
release where defendant did not object at sentencing); United 
States v. Corona-Gonzalez, 628 F.3d 336, 340 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(reviewing for plain error, where defendant failed to object at 
sentencing, defendant‟s claim that the district court relied on 
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recognizes, even the Supreme Court has indicated a 
preference for requiring the defendant to object in order to 
preserve issues for appeal.  See Puckett v. United States, 556 
U.S. 129, 134 (2009) (“This limitation on appellate-court 
authority serves to induce the timely raising of claims and 
objections, which gives the district court the opportunity to 
consider and resolve them.”).    
 
Finally, there are convincing reasons why plain error 
review in these circumstances would aid the administration of 
justice.  Requiring a defendant to contemporaneously object 
to an error in sentencing facilitates the quick resolution of 
                                                                                                                                  
incorrect facts at sentencing); but cf. United States v. Bartlett, 
567 F.3d 901, 910 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding defendant 
preserved his appellate options even though he did not object 
at sentencing because he argued for a lower sentence and 
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51(b) “[e]xceptions 
to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary.” (quoting 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b))).  The Eighth Circuit has also applied 
plain error review where the defendant did not object to the 
District Court‟s explanation of the sentence.  See United 
States v. Rice, 699 F.3d 1043, 1049 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(reviewing for plain error where the defendant did not object 
to the district court‟s explanation of the sentence at 
sentencing but argued on appeal that the district court failed 
to adequately explain its reasons for denying a downward 
departure or variance).  And the Eleventh Circuit, although it 
has not addressed this issue in a precedential decision, has 
applied plain error review to claims of procedural 
unreasonableness in non-precedential opinions, see, e.g., 
United States v. Girard, 440 F. App‟x 894, 901 & n.6 (11th 
Cir. 2011).   
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such errors.  As the Supreme Court observed, “errors are a 
constant in the trial process,” and when a defendant 
contemporaneously objects, the district court “can often 
correct or avoid the mistake so that it cannot possibly affect 
the ultimate outcome.”  Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  Plain error review in 
circumstances like these advances the public interest because 
“[r]equiring the error to be preserved by an objection creates 
incentives for the parties to help the district court meet its 
obligations to the public and the parties.”  Villafuerte, 502 
F.3d at 211.  By encouraging defendants to make objections 
before the court most equipped to resolve the errors 
efficiently and effectively, a rule applying plain error review 
in cases like these arguably promotes better sentencing 
practices.   
 
The Fourth Circuit, the only other circuit to 
affirmatively adopt the same rule as Sevilla, commented that 
“[r]equiring a party to lodge an explicit objection after the 
district court explanation would saddle busy district courts 
with the burden of sitting through an objection-probably 
formulaic-in every criminal case.”  Lynn, 592 F.3d at 578 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  I do not 
agree.  Sentencing is a complex process, and a district court 
judge at sentencing must meet numerous requirements.  
Objections, even if time-consuming at the time of sentencing, 
serve the important purpose of reminding the judge of these 
requirements and allowing the judge to immediately remedy 
omissions and clarify inadequate explanations.  The rule 
adopted in Sevilla (and Lynn) arguably imposes a greater 
burden on busy district courts by depriving them of 
contemporaneous notice of errors and of the opportunity to 
correct those errors.  Cf. Judge, 649 F.3d at 458 
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(“[P]resenting the district court with substantive arguments is 
not the same as making an objection to the district court‟s 
explanation of its consideration of those arguments.”).  The 
time and resources required to correct errors through a 
lengthy appeal and resentencing pale in comparison to the 
burden of sitting through objections.
2
  As such, the Sevilla  
rule results in a great waste of judicial resources.  Our strong 
interest in judicial economy, heightened in these times of 
fiscal restraint and judicial budgetary concerns, argues in 
favor of a rule applying plain error review. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that Sevilla is poor 
precedent and should be revisited.   
 
II. 
 
Moreover, even under Sevilla, I believe that in this 
case we should affirm the District Court‟s sentence.  The 
majority holds that the District Court did not meaningfully 
consider Flores-Mejia‟s argument, reasoning that this is an “a 
fortiori case under Sevilla.”  (Majority Op. at 8).  In Sevilla, 
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 Resentencing imposes a significant burden on district 
courts:  not only do district courts have to find time in their 
busy dockets to revisit errors that could have been resolved 
with a contemporaneous objection at the original sentencing 
but they also have the burden of reassembling the parties 
involved, the prisoner/defendant, the attorneys, witnesses, and 
law enforcement authorities.  Moreover, new arguments may 
have arisen which that will now require consideration at 
resentencing.  See Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229 
(2011) (holding that at resentencing a district court may 
consider post-sentencing rehabilitation).   
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we noted that “[a]lthough the [District] Court considered 
Sevilla‟s role in the crime compared to that of his co-
conspirators, it did not address Sevilla‟s colorable arguments 
relating to his childhood and the crack/powder disparity other 
than to say that it had „considered all of the [§] 3553(a) 
factors.‟”  541 F.3d at 232.  On that basis, we held that the 
district court did not meaningfully consider the childhood and 
crack/powder disparity arguments.  Id.   
 
The instant case is distinguishable from Sevilla.
3
  Here, 
the District Court specifically responded to the argument at 
issue on appeal.  After Flores-Mejia‟s counsel concluded her 
argument regarding Flores-Mejia‟s attempts at cooperation, 
the District Court stated “OK thanks, anything else?”  In view 
of the obvious discussion before the District Court of Flores-
Mejia‟s argument and the District Court‟s comment in 
response, I believe we can conclude that the District Court 
gave meaningful consideration to the argument.  The 
Supreme Court has held, “[w]here . . . the record makes clear 
that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and 
arguments, we do not believe the law requires the judge to 
write more extensively.”  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 
359 (2007).  Because I believe that the record makes clear 
that the District Court gave meaningful consideration to 
Flores-Mejia‟s argument for a lower sentence based on his 
attempts at cooperation, I believe the District Court‟s 
sentence should be affirmed. 
                                                          
3
 The government argues that Sevilla overlooked and 
conflicted with controlling Supreme Court precedent in Rita 
v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).  I do not adopt that 
argument here but rather assert only that this case is 
distinguishable from Sevilla. 
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III. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, Sevilla should be revisited.  
Even if it is not, however, the District Court‟s judgment of 
sentence here should be affirmed. 
